Introduction
In recent years, Ayman Nour has emerged as a prominent leader of the Egyptian liberal opposition and as a symbol of a younger generation that yearns to promote democracy throughout Egypt and the Arab world. He is regarded by many in the Arab world and in the West as a liberal democratic alternative to Husni Mubarak's deposed authoritarian regime, as well as a moderate secular alternative to the Islamist opposition, the Muslim Brotherhood.
While Israel is mentioned in Ayman Nour's speeches, articles and interviews, it is worth noting that domestic issues, rather than foreign affairs, are the focus of his interests. And while the platform of his Tomorrow Party does not include a clear statement concerning the future of the Egyptian peace treaty with Israel, the Jewish state is referred to in the party's platform and in a significant number of its official statements. These sources are important indicators of Nour's attitude toward Israel. This article examines this attitude through analysis of three issues: (a) his views on the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty and normalizing relations with Israel; (b) the distinction between his respective approaches to the United States and to Israel; (c) his vision for the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the future of IsraeliEgyptian peace relations. Analyzing Nour's attitude toward Israel is important for several reasons. First, as a prominent Egyptian oppositionist with aspirations to power, it is interesting to examine what kind of alternative, if any, Nour offers concerning the Israeli issue.
Second, in his intensive public activity over the past years, Nour embodies a unique case study for Israel's role in the overall political agenda of a liberal oppositionist in contemporary Egypt. Third, Nour's case may shed some light on the possible implications concerning the Egyptian peace treaty with Israel of a hypothetical scenario in which a liberal leader of his kind will come to power.
Biographical Background
Nour was born in 1964 in Mansurah. His father was a lawyer and a member of the Egyptian Parliament and his mother established and supervised a number of charity projects in his hometown. During the 1980s, after graduating from the Faculty of Law at Mansurah University, he started his career as a lawyer and a journalist in the opposition newspaper al-Wafd. In 1992, Nour wrote a book entitled al-Libaraliyya hiya al-Hall ("Liberalism is the Solution", a paraphrase of the famous Islamic slogan "Islam is the solution"). In 1995, Nour earned his Ph.D. in the History of Law in Russia. That year, he was elected to the Egyptian People's Assembly, where he served for two terms between 1995 and 2005.
1 Until 2001 he represented the liberal party alWafd, but following disagreements with the party's chairman, Naʿman Jumʿa, in 2003 he established "The Tomorrow Party" (Hizb al-Ghad), Egypt's first new opposition party in more than half a century. The party was not formally recognized by the Egyptian government until 27 October 2004; Nour was elected chairman at the first party convention held immediately afterwards. 2 The party promotes a bold public agenda, addressing issues such as human rights, freedom of speech, reform of the legal code, free elections for the presidency and restrictions on presidential power, as well as domestic policies on issues such as job creation, social welfare programs and education.
In July 2005, Nour announced his candidacy for the Egyptian presidential election, scheduled for September 2005. In the election, Nour came second to Mubarak, receiving 7% of the total vote (approximately 540,000 votes), although foreign political observers claim he received as much as 13% of the vote. 3 Earlier that year, his candidacy had been jeopardized by his 30 January arrest for allegedly falsifying signatures on his party"s registration papers. Nour was released six weeks later, only after the American Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, expressed concern regarding his arrest and cancelled her planned visit to Cairo in protest.
for September 2011, even though the state had banned him from engaging in political activity for five years after his release. 5 In February 2010, Nour was officially nominated by his party"s council as its candidate for president. 6 Since his release, Nour has made significant efforts to strengthen his position, both within the Egyptian political arena and internationally. In early April 2009, he launched the "Cairo Declaration," a document issued in cooperation with other Egyptian opposition leaders in which they called for democracy and political reforms in Egypt. 7 Nour's campaign to draw public attention to the document included visits to most Egyptian governorates where he met with youth, non-governmental organizations, and ordinary Egyptians. Throughout this campaign, he tried to convince audiences to sign the "Cairo Declaration" and support the Tomorrow Party. 8 Likewise, Nour intensified his activity within the Egyptian opposition movement, voicing opposition to Gamal Mubarak"s possible inheritance of Egypt's presidency from his father. Indeed, in October 2009, Nour became the driving force behind the establishment of a new oppositional group, the National Front Against the Succession. 9 A few months later, in February 2010, Nour collaborated with former Director General of IAEA, Dr. Muhammad al-Baradaʿi, alongside other oppositional leaders, in establishing the National Association for Change, an umbrella organization calling for the promotion of "real democracy and social justice" in Egypt. 10 Following a decision made by this organization, the Tomorrow Party boycotted both rounds of the elections for the People's Assembly of 2010, held on November 28 th and December 5 th respectively. Although the party won one seat, which was the same result as the elections of 2005, Nour refused to recognize its "fake" results, and expressed his support for the initiative to establish a shadow parliament, aiming to challenge the legitimacy of the newly elected one.
11 It is worth noting that Nour's cooperation with other opposition forces is not restricted to his liberal counterparts, but also includes cooperation with the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt's most powerful opposition group. Despite deep ideological differences, he has found it necessary to maintain a tactical dialogue with the Islamist opposition around their common political goals. 12 On 14 April 2009, Nour made an international appearance when he spoke in front of the European Parliament in Brussels, calling upon its members to cease "supporting the tyranny" in Egypt. 13 18 Other studies have focused on the ideas and the particular circumstances of individuals within the liberal Egyptian circles. 19 The specific attitudes of Egyptian liberals toward Israel have also been discussed in several studies, particularly in the literature concerning the signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in March 1979, and the question of normalization of IsraeliEgyptian relations. 20 Understanding the current state of liberalism in Egypt requires a brief historical overview. Liberalism was the unifying element of the constitutional monarchy period . This Egyptian "liberal age" (to borrow Albert Hourani's term) was characterized by lively intellectual discourse, as well as a multi-party political system which represented mainly the rural and the urban elites. Nevertheless, it worked to promote changes in all spheres of life, including the foundation of constitutional structure, legal reform, schooling and university systems and economic entrepreneurship. Amongst the most prominent liberals of that era were Muhammad Husayn Haykal, Ahmad Amin, ʿAbbas Mahmud al-ʿAqqad and Taha Husayn. Their thought was dominated by the principles of reason, rationalism, scientific spirit, separation of religion and politics, critical reexamination of the Islamic law and critical borrowing from the Western culture, and by dedication to the values of progress, freedom, pluralism, democracy and humanism. Since the 1930s, in the face of growing social tensions and the rise of competing Islamic and Arab Nationalist ideologies, Egyptian liberalism experienced a gradual process of decline both politically and ideologically. The Egyptian liberal age came to its end with the Revolution of 1952 and the dismantling of the ruling al-Wafd party.
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Under Nasser, many liberals backed the revolution in the hope that it would provide for revival and modernity, although a minority among them engaged in rather feeble protests in the form of allegorical plays or limited demonstrations. In the early 1970s, after almost two decades of relative absence from the Egyptian public arena, liberalism reemerged as a part of Anwar al-Sadat's de-Nasserization campaign. The remaining veterans of the old liberal age, such as Egypt's greatest writers, Tawfiq alHakim and Nagib Mahfuz, were once again at center stage, leading the revival of the liberal trend. Since the 1980s, new generations of "neo-liberals" have grown, including Farag Foda, Husayn Ahmad Amin, Saʿid al-Naggar and others. Although the post-revolution liberals shared most principles and values with the pre-revolution generation, they operated in an entirely different social, cultural and political climate. In particular, they had to face the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, and most importantly, unlike their predecessors, they constituted a small minority which was not a part of the ruling elite.
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Under Sadat's rule, the proclamation of infitāḥ initiated the liberalization of the economic structure and reestablished a dynamic free-enterprise sector. These developments were accompanied by a small measure of political pluralism, which was manifested by the establishment of a limited and supervised party system. During Mubarak's era, there has been a substantial expansion of free speech, alongside greater permission for the registration of new political parties. Electoral politics have been conducted according to a "restricted party plurality" system that relies on a strong ruling party surrounded by small opposition groups. 23 However, the evolution of liberties in Egypt over these years has always been interrupted by heavy 22 Ibid. 23 Tzoreff, "De-Democratizing Egyptian Elections". authoritarian restrictions; that is to say, trials of civilians by military courts, growing numbers of political prisoners, attempts to muzzle the press, limitations on institutions of civil society and widespread official interference in the elections. 24 A recent example of such de-liberalization steps taken by the authorities was provided in the 2010 elections for the People's Assembly, in which the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) and affiliated independents won 93% of the seats, while a heavy-handed strategy was implemented to defeat opposition candidates.
25
In contemporary Arab debates liberals are usually defined broadly as "scholars and activists whose main concern is the introduction of Western-type democracy in Arab countries." 26 The Tomorrow Party, which defines its line as "socialist liberal democratic," 27 has indeed made the liberalization of the Egyptian regime through free and fair elections its main political message and leading demand. 28 The party's political platform defines "liberal democracy" as a "peaceful format for managing disagreements and conflicts in accordance with principles which are accepted by all parties [involved] ." It sets the target of "struggling for […] the creation of democratic society based on the participation of all nationalities, groups and classes in determining the fate of their homeland". 29 In September 2009, during a visit to the Suez Governorate, Nour elaborated that "liberalism means the acceptance of the other, religious tolerance and citizenship rights." 30 As regards economic policy, the party's platform calls for "economic liberalism based on the freedom of possession, fair competition and encouragement of innovation and creativity, while setting [appropriate] regulations." Al-Sayyid and many other liberals sought to establish the Nile Valley as the sole basis of modern Egyptian national identity. As such, they did not feel so committed to the relatively distant Arab-Jewish conflict in Mandatory Palestine, but were rather indifferent about it. 33 This type of liberal discourse was still evident even on the eve of the Egyptian invasion of Israel on 15 May 1948; in a closed session held by the Egyptian parliament's upper house, the former Egyptian prime minister, Ismaʿil Sidqi Pasha, called on his country in vain to avoid war, saying that Egypt does not have "a major share in the Palestine conflict" and its "supreme interest lies in the establishment of stable peace." 34 Accordingly, it is no wonder that during the 1970s, 24 some liberals, such as Mahfuz and al-Hakim, were amongst the most devoted advocates of a separate peace with Israel, urging their country to favor its own particular interests over Arab ones. At the same time, liberals who were considered proponents of the Pan-Arab ideology, such as Yusuf Idris and al-Sayyid Yasin, were far more reluctant to accept a partial settlement of the conflict. 35 The positions of liberals toward Israel in contemporary Egypt are varied. Some of them see peace with Israel as an essential component of Egypt"s transition from what they perceive as a reality of backwardness and oppression towards a future of progressiveness and freedom. Peace with Israel, in their view, is a precondition for the promotion of political, economical and cultural liberalism in their country. Moreover, they tend to portray Israel as sort of a "role model" for democracy, pluralism and freedom in the region. 36 While the vast majority of these liberals call for an Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories occupied in 1967, many of them support a "warm peace" with Israel, including normalization in different fields, such as economic cooperation, intensive people-to-people interactions, tourism and cultural exchange. 37 This group includes, among others, Tariq Heggy, Amin Al-Mahdi, ʿAli Salem, Saʿd al-Din Ibrahim, and Muhammad Saʿid al-ʿAshmawi. Heggy, for instance, has published an article encouraging the Egyptian media to promote what he called "the culture of peace" with Israel. "A war culture," he argued, "[…] will divert our energies from what should be our main target at this juncture: building up a strong society capable of facing external challenges effectively by using the same tools as those used by advanced, successful societies, not those of a Bedouin mentality used by people addicted to failure." 38 On the other hand, contemporary liberalism in Egypt is not always accompanied by pacifist attitudes toward Israel. There are many Egyptian liberals who do not consider peace with Israel an integral part of their agenda, and strongly object to any form of normalization with Israel. Objection to normalization usually belongs to one of two categories -conditional or categorical: some insist that normal relations with Israel must be avoided so long as Israel occupies Arab territory, while others deeply believe that Israel is imperialist by its very nature, and warn against the dangers of an Israeli cultural invasion and its expansionist ambitions. Many liberals who belong to the latter group have Islamist orientations, 39 as is the case with Gamal al-Bana and Hasan Hanafi, 40 and George Ishaq. 41 Qindil is one of the founders of Enough Movement (Harakat Kifaya), also known as the Egyptian Movement for Change, a group that promotes democracy and reforms. Qindil has suggested conducting a referendum on the "freezing or cancellation of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty" as a necessary step in order to liberate Egypt from "the dictations of American-Israeli colonialism." 42 Egyptian liberals also disagree about the relationship between democratization and the peace with Israel. While democratic peace theories argue that liberally constituted states tend to be more peaceful in their dealings with other countries, 43 some Egyptian liberals, such as Qindil, see future democracy in their country as a means of liberation from the "chains" of the Camp David Accords. 44 Other liberals, on the other hand, see democracy not just as a guarantee for the absence of war with Israel, but also as a prerequisite for the creation of a warmer peace in the future. Amin al-Mahdi, for example, distinguishes between the desired "democratic peace" and the current "cold peace" with Israel: "True peace can only be democratic, whereas a peace that was made with no [democratic] choice is not a true one. It can [only] be a peace of surrender, an imposed peace, an official peace and so forth." […] I would like to conclude that the "anti-Semitic" label is one that I strongly reject. My critiques pertain to the conduct of the state of Israel in certain contexts and not to the Jewish people as a whole. The history of Egypt is replete with contributions from Jewish Egyptians, and that history of pluralism that once defined Egypt is one that I recall fondly and deeply respect. Principles of religious pluralism and mutual respect and tolerance are principles that I strongly advocate not just in my position as a political activist, but as a human being. 47 Systematic study of Nour's speeches on Israel in various contexts over the past decade reveals a multifaceted picture. On the one hand, Nour speaks of Israel as an enemy of Egypt and the Arab world. He has adopted a hostile tone against it, and expressed his support for Palestinian and Lebanese acts of violence. In addition, he refuses to meet with Israelis and strongly objects to any kind of cultural or economic normalization with Israel. On the other hand, Nour does not call for the annulment of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and is not interested in resuming warfare against Israel, but rather accepts the existence of Israel alongside Palestine in the 1967 borders. Likewise, his objection to normalization with Israel is conditional, not categorical, and may possibly be lifted in the future, as political circumstances change.
Nour's conflicting positions toward Israel in the Wall Street Journal may be partly attributed to the different audiences he addressed, namely Egyptian public opinion in the first case, and American public opinion in the other. However, considering the fact that similar duality is evident also in other of Nour's speeches, as well as in official statements of the Tomorrow Party, further explanation is required. As I shall argue, understanding Nour's motives allows us to interpret his position toward Israel on three different levels: First, these statements obviously reflected something authentic and genuine in his point of view. Second, his position toward Israel was sometimes a part of a broader line against the Egyptian regime, and did not necessarily represent a systematic doctrine; it reflected a tactical position rather than an ideological one. Third, another factor most likely motivated Nour to adopt a hostile tone against Israel was the popular appeal of this position. Presumably, by utilizing the strong anti-Israel sentiment in Egypt, he attempted to expand his political base as well as promote his broader liberal messages among wider audiences in Egyptian society. 48 The Tomorrow Party's political platform (which is based on a book written by Nour in 2002) highlights the value of peace. It opens with a statement on its belief in "peace, friendship and interaction with all peoples of the world"; 49 likewise, without explicit mention of the name of Israel, the foreign policy section in the platform begins by emphasizing the "principle of resolving disputes between countries in peaceful ways." 50 In the section describing its principles, the party declares that "Peace based on justice will enable the peoples of the region and the world to achieve comprehensive development, prosperity and welfare, and will enable Egypt to actively participate in the formation of the global culture and the world order, by dialogue and cooperation with other civilizations and countries." 51 Despite the aforementioned peaceful rhetoric, the rest of the platform raises doubts whether these principles apply to Israel. Its general foreign policy section calls upon Arab countries to reunite "against the Zionist enemy." 52 Regarding the situation in the Middle East, and, more precisely, the second Intifada, the platform criticizes the "official Arab stance" that relies on "condemnation and censure, without [the use of] effective mechanisms, in order to stop Arab bloodshed on the Palestinian lands." Israeli soldiers and settlers were subjected to approximately 5,000 firearms attacks and 250 grenades throwing since the beginning of the Intifada. Not to mention the recent martyr operations, which not only put an end to the [Israeli] arrogance, but also raised doubts whether the [Israeli] use of force and violence against the Palestinians is the shortest way to end the intifada and achieve security. 54 Beyond its belligerent tone, the Tomorrow Party's official statements also fuel hostility against Israel and what they describe as Israeli government actions. The party's political platform refers to Israel as "the Zionist enemy." 55 Moreover, former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon is described as implementing a "Nazi policy which was manifested in [the] oppression, killing and murder" of Palestinians during the Second Intifada. 56 Similarly, in response to the Gaza War (Operation Cast Lead) in December 2008, the party accused Israel of committing a "racist immoral Zionist crime." Nour himself blamed Israel in one of his articles for committing an "inhumane massacre." 57 Somewhat oddly, the platform even calls upon Egypt to fight against the alleged Israeli conspiracies "to incite the African countries to attack on Egypt's profits and its historical right to the Nile water." 58 Nour is also known as a critic of normalization with Israel, which constitutesde jure, at least -an integral part of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. In a recent article, Nour stressed that his objection to normalization may be lifted only by "Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and a fair final solution for the Palestinian problem and for Jerusalem." He explained, "indeed, we have an official peace treaty [with Israel], but sentiments are not controlled by treaties nor by the authority of the government." 59 As a parliament member, Nour founded the Egyptian parliamentary committee to promote the boycott of Israeli goods. 60 Likewise, he blatantly refuses to meet with Israelis. 61 His deep commitment to the Egyptian anti-normalization movement was again revealed in July 2009 after his release from prison. After a four year hiatus, he resumed his "Wednesday Meetings," a weekly conference held at the Nour Culture Center in Cairo. Symbolically, the first such meeting was dedicated to what was defined as the "crime" of exporting Egyptian natural gas to Israel at a cheap price. Although Nour explained his objection to the Israeli-Egyptian gas export agreement primarily on the grounds of economic considerations, his emotional resistance to normalization may also played an important role.
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At times, Nour's anti-Israeli attitudes should not be taken at face value; such rhetoric was a way for him to criticize the Egyptian regime. For example, during the aforementioned "Wednesday Meeting" concerning the export of gas to Israel, Nour proposed the compilation of a blacklist of names that "will be chased by the shame of wasting Egypt's resources." This list included former President Mubarak, his son Gamal and other high-ranking officials. 63 Likewise, in response to the Gaza War, the Tomorrow Party released a statement that "the party condemns the despicable Zionist offensive against the brother Palestinian people, and condemns with the same harshness the helplessness and the absence of strategic vision, which has became synonymous with Egyptian foreign policy during the last years." 64 Following the events of the Gaza flotilla raid on 31 May 2010, Nour condemned the "Israeli bullying of civilians." Concomitantly, he called for protest marches against the "Arab silence" which, in his opinion, "reached the level of a shameful conspiracy". 65 The frequent use of anti-Israeli rhetoric as leverage against the authoritarian regime was repeated by Nour in other speeches. For instance, in an article commemorating the 41 st anniversary of the 1967 war, he blamed the Arab defeat on the dictatorial Arab regimes:
How can someone who is defeated from within win?! How can he fight when he is hand-cuffed, oppressed by all the [security] apparatuses, worthless and lacking an opinion?! How can he win when he is denied the minimum right to choose who will rule [his country] and who will represent him?! […] Despite this, we decided not to learn the lesson and not to face the origin of the disease.
[…] After 'some' of the Arab territory had returned, isn't it our right to ask when we will get back 'some' of our democratic rights? 66
Anti-Israel, Ambivalence toward America
In contrast to many Egyptian liberals with nationalistic tendencies, Nour distinguishes between his approach to Israel and his approach to the United States. This distinction was made explicit in June 2005, when the High Council of the Tomorrow Party discussed whether to approve a meeting between Nour and American Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice, during her upcoming visit to Cairo. The party spokeswoman and Nour's wife, Gamila Ismaʿil, announced that "it has been decided that the Tomorrow Party will accept to enter into a dialogue or exchange ideas with any 62 During his speech, Nour boasted that as early as 15 January 2000 he had requested in Parliament a clarification from Egyptian Petroleum Minister, Samih Fahmi, as to how exporting gas to Israel is in accordance with Egyptian "sentiments and causes". See: Ahmad Ghanim, "Mu"tamar La li-Tasdir alGhaz li-Isra"il", http://aymannoor.net/ar/?p=450 (accessed 12 July 2009). 63 Ibid. 64 Hizb al-Ghad, "Bayan Hizb al-Ghad bi-Khusus Ahdath Ghazzah". 68 and spoke against "the American hegemony in the region" and its "pro-Israel bias." 69 Furthermore, Secretary Rice's public support following his arrest contributed to the regime"s portrayal of Nour as an American collaborator; he was labeled with insulting nicknames such as "Condoleezza's friend" or her "common law husband." 70 Hence, despite Secretary Rice"s important role in obtaining his release, Nour felt embarrassed by her involvement in his case and renounced her support. "I did not ask anyone to defend me," he stressed. "I am in favor of international empathy, but against international intervention." 71 In the same vein, he was reluctant to meet with her, presumably out of fear that such a meeting might cost him votes in the September 2005 election. Yet during his subsequent imprisonment, Nour was apparently once again looking for American aid, despite its undesirable potential side effects. Furthermore, he was disappointed at President Bush"s lack of commitment to his freedom agenda. "I can"t say that the American administration has always been serious in pushing for my release," he said at that time. "Sometimes it gave priority to principles, but more often interests prevailed." 72 The discrepancy between Nour's approaches to the United States and to Israel grew wider after Barack Obama entered the White House in January 2009. Nour responded enthusiastically to Obama"s election, and suggested that pressure from the new American administration played a role in his release. 73 During his May 2009 speech to Congress, Nour expressed his "high expectations" of President Obama. 74 Even before the American elections, when Obama was still only a presidential candidate, Nour sent him a warm open letter from his prison, ending as follows:
Senator Obama, We await much from you as a Democratic candidate and president expected to lead the whole world towards a real and fair change. Your generation and all the powers of reform, democrats and liberals in Egypt and the Arab world, hope that January 20 [2009] becomes a day of freedom and democracy not only in the United States of America but in the whole world, primarily by rectifying the wrongs caused by long years of supporting dictators under the pretext of protecting interests at the account of principles. Please accept my sincere wishes for your success. 75 Yet, even after President Obama took office, Nour has been careful not to be overly identified with the United States. In May 2009, he refused an invitation to visit Washington, including both a private lunch with President Obama and an appearance before the American Congress. Instead, he limited himself to a live video conference speech from Cairo, in which he called for an expansion of American foreign aid to Egypt, while restraining his criticism against the Mubarak regime. He was determined not to fall into another trap that would enable the Egyptian regime to portray him as a traitor serving American interests. On the contrary, in an interview with the Egyptian daily al-Masri al-Yawm, he stressed that his speech to the Congress meant "to explain [the Egyptian] point of view to the world". 76 Obama's Cairo speech on 4 June 2009 provided another example of the basic ambivalence underlying Nour's position concerning the United States and its desired role in the region. A few days before the speech, he urged President Obama to try to balance "between amicable relations with existing regimes ruling Muslim countries and long-term friendship with the people who regard these regimes as oppressive and corrupt," and "between regional stability and demands for reform and democracy." 77 After hearing the speech, however, Nour did not hide his disappointment, saying that "what touched on democracy and human rights in the speech was far less than what we wanted." 78 To conclude, while taking a hostile stance toward Israel, Nour sees the United States as a potential partner in promoting democratization in Egypt; at the same time, he does not fully trust its intentions and strives to keep a safe distance from its patronage.
Nour's Vision for the Future
In light of Nour's hostile stance toward Israel, it is interesting to investigate how he envisions the future of relations between Egypt and Israel. Does he support the continuation of the peace treaty, or perhaps a return to a state of war? This question became more urgent in light of the Gaza War during the winter of 2008-2009, as Nour wrote in one of his articles: "There is a question that doesn't stop bothering me, what should we do?! Will we protest, condemn, burn cloths with drawings of the Star of David, threaten, be silent, drown in shame, spit in the faces of our regimes?! […] Is there a reasonable Egyptian with good intentions who expects Mubarak to declare war on Israel?!" Nour's answer was very decisive: "I believe that "no" is the only answer to all the aforementioned questions." After rejecting all these militant reactions to the Gaza War, Nour offered his own solution. As usual, he quickly diverted all his arrows from Israel toward the Egyptian regime, criticizing it for "failing" to use its influence in order to prevent "Hamas's mistakes" and "Israeli aggression.
[…] The only solution," Nour stressed, "is to change the hands that took care of this issue, starting with [Egyptian foreign minister, Ahmad] Abu Al-Gheit." "The most trivial response to this failure," he continued, "is a consistent opening of the Rafah border crossing and a declaration by President [Mubarak] that he is committed to the verdict of the gas exporting trial [which stated the freeze of natural gas export to Israel]." 79 Nour, therefore, is encouraging neither a return to a state of war with Israel, nor a reversal of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. 80 Nevertheless, as an Egyptian leader, Nour has been attempting to put forth an alternative to the official Egyptian approach regarding the nature of relations with Israel. In one article, for instance, he hints that Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is the public figure he most admires, for his policy on Israel as well as on other foreign and domestic affairs. While this article was seemingly written for the sake of glorifying Erdoğan's anti-Israeli position during the Gaza War, Nour peppered it with references to the many similarities between Erdoğan's biography and his own. 81 First, Erdoğan is young, 55, and quite unlike politicians of the "older generation"" Second, Erdoğan was imprisoned in 1998 because of "the fear from his increasing popularity and public influence pushed the Turkish state to fabricate a ridiculous prosecution against him". Third, in 2007 he formed a new party "in order to fight against poverty, hunger and corruption, and to change the social and the political reality in Turkey." 82 Nour appears to have used his article to co-opt Erdoğan's increasing popularity following the Gaza War, due to his anti-Israeli positions, in order to legitimize and promote a much broader message. At the end of his article, Nour praised Erdoğan's domestic and foreign achievements in Turkey, hinting at his own desire to implement a similar vision in Egypt:
Within a very few years, Erdoğan succeeded in creating a new Turkey, while making the dreams of his people come true and strengthening the domestic political and economical abilities of his homeland. Then, after his genuine domestic achievements, Erdoğan had to rehabilitate the Turkish role in the foreign arena, by strengthening its eligibility for European Union membership and playing important roles in the Middle East and in the Islamic [world] . That was the real beginning of Erdoğan's role in the Gaza crisis, which gained -as most of his positions -the overwhelming support of the people in Turkey. 83 should be "a middle of the road person, who is not from Hamas, but at the same time, accepted by it.
[…] Marwan al-Barghouti," he assumes, "is the best one to lead the Palestinians through this era, because he is a symbol of struggling and is also a young charismatic man, who is accepted by all [Palestinian] parties." 84 Nour's preference of al-Barghouti over ʿAbbas does not necessarily indicate his objection to the moderate, compromising line that ʿAbbas represents, but rather his belief that achieving peace requires an attractive successor to ʿAbbas, one who is capable of competing with Hamas's popularity. In fact, Nour attributes great importance to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which he believes has "consumed the blood and capacities of the people and opened the door to fundamentalism, terrorism and oppression" in order to weaken radical Islamic forces like Hamas. 85 According to his open letter to Obama, as well as to the Tomorrow Party political platform, Nour accepts the two state solution; in other words, the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, according to the borders of 1967. In this respect, Nour"s view is in accordance with the mainstream international position, including United Nations resolution 242 and the principle of "land for peace." 86 
Conclusion
This article has analyzed Ayman Nour's position toward Israel based on his articles, speeches and interviews, as well as official statements of his party. Although Israel is not at the focus of Nour's political discourse, he has mentioned Israel in a variety of contexts, including the Second Intifada, Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon, Egypt"s export of natural gas to Israel, the Gaza War and the Gaza flotilla raid.
Nour capitalized upon each of these to promote his line against the Egyptian regime. He has repeatedly criticized what he views as the regime's helplessness in the face of Israeli military operations and, moreover, its readiness to foster cooperation and normal relations with Israel. This kind of criticism was intended to portray Mubarak's regime as weak, subordinate and betraying Arab national interests by obeying the dictates of Israel and the United States. At the same time, this line also enabled Nour and his party to emerge as an honorable, patriotic alternative.
The recent events of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution have made the scenario of a liberal candidate coming to power much more realistic. While Nour did not initiate the demonstrations of 25 January, he played an active role by leading his supporters in the streets of Cairo and urging Mubarak to depart from his office. 87 Although the revolution was fueled by domestic demands, the future relations with Israel were on the agenda of most Egyptian political actors. Some liberal activists, such as the blogger, Maikel Nabil Sanad, saw the democratization of their country as a "chance to end cold peace between the two states [i.e., Egypt and Israel] and to begin a new era of real peace." 88 The Egyptian Armed Forces, which took over the government during the transition period, announced that Egypt will remain "committed to the treaties and
